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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to examine the existence and development of Lumbung Desa or village 
rice barns as a credit institution during the colonial era. It was expected to be an inspiration and 
reference to revitalize, design, and develop barns at the village level that contributed significantly 
to the village welfare at the recent time.  Therefore, how and why was Lumbung Desa institution 
able to develop during the colonial era? How much was its contribution to the village welfare? To 
examine these questions, the authors used critical historical method and through economical and 
sociological approach. The result shows that Lumbung Desa was formed and developed by the 
Dutch to overcome poverty as a strategic issue at the time, especially at village level. The grand 
design program of Lumbung Desa was to channel loan schemes especially and savings that could be 
in the form of in cash or rice. It was used to help farmers against the middlemen and moneylenders 
who were considered as adverse parties for the villagers. Lumbung Desa existed and was managed 
in many villages of Java during the colonial era. It relied on rural communities with distinctive 
personal socio-economic relations that brought about both strengths and weaknesses for the 
institution. However, there were some advantages of Lumbung Desa; first, it provided loans in two 
types, cash and/ or rice which became major and urgent needs for the villagers; second, its presence 
in rural areas made farmers become customers and easily access the market; third, its flexibility 
made it easily transform according to rural community needs. 
Keywords: village rice barns, credit institution, poverty management, colonial period
INTRODUCTION
One of the principal problems faced by the Dutch 
Colonial government in the early twentieth 
century was poverty that hit most of indigenous 
communities in Dutch-East Indies. In Java 
especially, the issue of poverty can be analyzed 
from various factors. First, it is indicated by the 
intake of food consumed by indigenous people. 
According to Boomgaard calculation; the number 
of consumed calories by villagers in 1880 was 
much lower than in 1815. Boomgaard calculates 
that consumed calories in 1880 reached 1698 
Page 234–244
kilo calories (kcal) per capita compares with 
1808 kcal in 1815 and moreover, the difference 
seems more obvious if all crops are converted to 
calories. If the issue of “quality” is included in the 
calculation, then all crops will be multipled to the 
equivalent of rice and calories consumed, so it can 
be counted that the indigenous population in 1880 
consumed 1562 kcal per year. It was much lower 
than in 1815 with 1830 kcal (Boomgaard, 2004).
Second, there was a decrease on indigenous 
people welfare. It is indicated by the number of 
working hours in productive sectors. According 
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to the liberals, working hours increased for 
indigenous people caused by the implementation 
of cultivation system was considered as one of the 
most influencial factors leading to poverty (Elson, 
1988). Long working hours indicate the maginitude 
of the workload of indigenous people. With this 
fact, their working hours increased during 1880 
compared with the previous period. Boomgaard 
also calculates the average increase of workload 
per-family farm, ranging from 592 hours in 1815 
up to 669 hours in 1880 (Boomgaard, 2004).
Working-hours increase should have 
been balanced with growth of rate per capita 
consumption. In the late nineteenth century, 
consumption level in Java decreased as it has 
been mentioned earlier. Boomgaard’s calculation 
excluded agricultural sector that could have 
calculated the average income (generated by 
agriculture) per family farm. Boomgaard’s 
calculation shows that consumption of rice per 
household in 1815 amounted to 1,378 kg of rice, 
1,086 kg in 1840, and 1,519 kg in 1880. It shows 
that family income in 1880 was much higher than 
1815, both were indicated by rice consumption. 
If it is reduced with the power of input index, the 
result becomes 1,344 kg of rice in 1880 compared 
with 1,378 kg in 1815 (Boomgaard, 2004). Based 
on the calculation, the farmer family incomes in 
1815 was still higher than in 1880.
The decrease income (consumption) among 
the population in Java can be viewed from 
the decline of food quality. In the end of the 
ninetheenth century, population in Java began 
consuming non-rice staples as their main food 
sources. In that condition, they turned to cassava 
or yam plant as alternative crops (Dixon, 1979). 
The government encouraged Javanese people to 
plant cassava, corn, and beans as alternative crops 
in addition to rice, especially during the famine 
(De Vries, 1987).
The colonial government realized the 
importance of alternative food sources. It was 
caused by rice price that continued to increase. 
This sufferred small local farmers. The dilemma 
was a decrease of welfare in Java. It must be 
addressed by introducing alternative food sources 
that can easily grow in almost all or any soil 
condition without requiring complex treatments. 
Rice crops need water and a high level of soil 
fertility with sufficient care. In addition, rice 
markets responded to variations in rainfall, 
which is an important factor in rice production, 
rainfall matters considerably to crop production, 
particularly rice (van der Eng, 2010). This policy 
indicates that there was a decline in prosperity 
among the indigenous population compared with 
the previous period.
This problem was solved by introducing 
Ethical Policy in 1901. It included agricultural 
loan scheme for rural communities (Baudet & 
Brugmans, 1987). The government introduced 
three credit institutions at the village level i.e., 
Bank Desa (village bank), Lumbung Desa (village 
barn), Afdelingbank (Knight, 2014). Credit 
institutions were very important to help farmers 
because they served as alternative money lending 
institutions with low initerest rate compared with 
loan sharks (Kern, 1904). Bank Desa was a unique 
credit institution. Lumbung Desa adhered two 
types of transaction formed in cash of money or 
in rice. It would be easier for villagers to apply for 
credit and pay. This article reveals the existence 
and development of Lumbung Desa as a village-
level credit institution and its contribution for 
improving the welfare of villagers. The study 
of Lumbung Desa refers to the study of credit 
development in Indonesia which is still limited. 
Several classifications of Lumbung Desa model 
refer to the credit system classification introduced 
by de Wolff van Westerrode (1897), a civil servant 
who lived in Java and much enthusiasm for 
cooperative belongs to Javanese farmers in the 
19th century. He adopted cooperative for farmers 
from Raiffeisen which was previously developed 
in Germany since 1849, this idea was applied in 
his working area at  Purwokerto (Henley, 2009; 
van Zanden & Marks, 2010). Meanwhile, almost 
at the same time, Meanwhile, there was other 
classification of credit system which was running 
in Java, a Resident of Cirebon J.W. Mesman 
somewhat modified a credit design that two years 
before it had been introduced by De Wolff. 
Lumbung Desa as one of the microfinance 
institutions that easily accessible by farmers in 
rural areas in the midst of credit expansion which 
was almost dominated by pawnshops and village 
banks (volksbanken). Therefore, as Zanden and 
Marks (2010) already predicted, there is one clear 
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doubt that clear institutions related to small-scale 
agriculture such as Lumbung Desa and village 
banks were predicted to face difficulties in carrying 
out its mission (van Zanden & Marks, 2010). 
Therefore, this paper aims to answer some 
questions; first, the main cause underlying 
the establishment of Lumbung Desa; second, 
management of organization including the funding 
of Lumbung Desa; and third, the advantages of 
Lumbung Desa as a village credit institution. 
Discussion of Lumbung Desa’s development 
as microcredit institution during 1905-1940 will 
be outlined below. Major analyze will be focused 
on the development number of lumbung desa 
and its capital in the form of rice and cash. The 
next section will be discussed about the village 
barn management which involved two kind of 
management models according to De Wolff and 
Mensman. This article also describes initial capital 
for the establishment of Lumbung Desa. The next 
section will be the advantages of this institution 
which has flexibility to survive when the Javanese 
people faced crisis due to economic depression of 
the 1930s.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Existence and Development of Lumbung 
Desa
Lumbung Desa existed in rural areas in Java since 
colonial era, especially in the beggining of XX 
century. Therefore, when the Dutch government 
implemented a program to address poverty issue 
in rural Java, thus the needed institution should be 
empowered, reformed, and developed. In response, 
the Dutch colonial government developed credit 
institutions at the village level. It was generally 
located in villages where rice could be grown as 
the main livelihood of rural people of Java. In 
many cases, villagers brought home their crops 
immediately when harvest season came because 
they had debt and were highly dependent on 
moneylenders and merchants. As results the crop 
price fell below expected rate of production cost. 
It was very detrimental, especially for farmers 
who felt their crops would be valued rapidly 
in harvesting season, it was happened when 
crops or rice already in traders (Stibbe, 1921). 
This condition contributed significantly to the 
decrease of their income and this decreaed their 
well-being. In such a condition, the village barns 
functioned to serve farmers so that they could be 
independence from traders, middlemen, pengijon, 
and moneylenders that were very detrimental 
to them. In the bad socio-economic life of the 
indigenous people, loan sharks became the most 
benefited and wealthy. A brief illustration can be 
viewed in Prawiro Suwarno’s life, it that referred as 
“the King of Pawn” during the depression (Amini, 
2006). The village barn expected the farmers to 
take their time in selling their crops to traders or 
middlemen although they were in a great need for 
cash to pay their debts to moneylenders. Through 
Lumbung Desa, the price of rice could be stable 
throughout the year, so it had positive effects on 
food supply for the residents and the farmers’ 
income. Furthermore, Lumbung Desa would allow 
farmers to work better without losing their capital 
(Djojohadikusumo, 1943).
Lumbung Desa benefitted for villagers, 
because the institution was come from, executed, 
and gave benefit to the villagers. It could be viewed 
on Lumbung Desa management. It was typically 
run with its own wealth gathered from villagers 
with certain criteria especially those who had 
rice fields. As property rights holders, the owners 
of rice fields were included villagers that given 
positions as financiers. In the active condition, the 
capital was in the forms of rice and cash which 
still owned by the institution. In addition to being 
deposited and loaned, it was for depreciation 
reserve, renovation, repair, and renew building. 
This reserve was paid as the capital to Bank Desa 
(village bank) deposited in a checking account of 
local banks and would be paid to the local people 
(Verslag van het Volkscredietwezen, 1911). This 
institution run by local communities at rural areas 
in the forms of rice or actual goods.
Lumbung Desa also had a function to stabilize 
rice price at farm level by preventing farmers 
from selling their rice right after it was (van Niel, 
1984). It was an indigenous business established 
at their own expense. It was conducted by, and for 
villagers. Through Lumbung Desa, they took some 
portion of the harvest to fulfil their own needs and 
to anticipate difficulties that mightoccur. If they 
were not able to deposit rice in Lumbung Desa, the 
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colonial government would provide zero-interest 
loan intended for farmers to purchase rice deposited 
in Lumbung Desa. When there was damage in 
Lumbung Desa, the government also provided 
assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Its 
goals were achieved by government intervention. 
Lumbung Desa lent rice to the members who had in 
trouble, and it was realized by all the members. In 
this manner, the villagers were expected to be free 
of debt bodage from the usurer (Rinardi, 2011). 
In its development, when its capital increased 
because of interest accumulation, the founders 
would gain back their shares (the initial capital in 
the form of paddy or rice). After the rest of their 
shares became the communal property of villagers 
(Huls, 1904).
There were three varieties of Lumbung Desa, 
they were rice seedlings barns (Lumbung Bibit 
Desa), tax barns (Lumbung Pajak), barn cooperative 
(Koperasi Lumbung). One of the examples, 
Lumbung Bibit was originally implemented in 
around 1855. At the time, the colonial government 
in Batavia wanted to introduce in every village a 
communal rice barn, in order to provide all farmers 
with sufficient rice seedlings. Many peasant 
cultivators had no rice left when they should start 
preparing their sawahs, either because they had 
been obliged to sell their stock, or because the last 
harvest had been insufficient to feed a family for 
a whole year (Boomgaard, 1991). However, this 
instititution was questioned could provide a good 
quality of seeds as good as the rice that the farmes 
had handed in. The village head started to use the 
rice stock for their own commercial purposes.
During its development, the Dutch colonial 
government tried to develop Lumbung Desa as 
village credit institutions that were expected to 
help economic difficulties that were often faced 
by villagers. The colonial government encouraged 
indigenous administration to foster Lumbung 
Desa. With this policy, it developed rapidly during 
the first decade of the twentieth century. Almost 
every place in Java established it (MVO Resident 
Oostout, 1907). However, the establishment was 
mostly executed without taking into account the 
villagers credit needs in rice (MVO Resident 
Riensum, 1913). Within six years, the number of 
Lumbung Desa increased dramatically. In 1905, 
there were 5,301 Lumbung Desa and the number 
increased to 12,625 in 1911, but in 1933 there 
were only 5.500 left due to so much resistance 
(Boomgaard, 1991). It shows that the government 
indeed actually encouraged the establishment of 
Lumbung Desa as credit institutions. The growth 
of Lumbung Desa can be seen in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1. Number of Lumbung Desa during the 
Period 1905-1940
Source: Compiled from Koloniaal Verslag 1907-
1917; Indisch Verslag 1931 and 1941; Statistisch 
Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indië; and Statistical 
Pocket Book of Indonesia, 1941.
As a credit institution in village level, one of 
the advantages of Lumbung Desa was their ability 
to store and provide suitable credit both in cash 
and or rice. It unique and interesting, especially 
in relation with government’s efforts to address 
problems faced by rural people in Java. In addition, 
the indicator shows that there was a trust among 
villagers in terms of the existence of Lumbung 
Desa as an institution to save and loan. Lumbung 
Desa had store rice from villagers with more than 
120 thousand tonnes since 1907. Meanwhile, their 
savings in cash has certainly above f.6 million 
since 1919 (Rinardi, 2011).
A superlative achievement demonstrated 
the ability of Lumbung Desa to provide credit in 
rice occurred in the period of 1910 and 1911. At 
that time, it was able to collect 177,000 tonnes 
rice from rural areas and distributed as credit for 
debtors. After that period, their ability collect 
rice from the villagers was slowly declining. The 
situation was caused by changing interest of rural 
needs to loan money in cash compared than rice. 
At the same time, the number of Lumbung Desa 
Humaniora, Vol. 29, Number 3 October 2017
238
continued to decrease, for example in 1911 there 
were 12.625 Lumbung Desa institution and in 
1919 the number decreased to 9.974. Lumbung 
Desa tried to attract villagers in deposite and loan, 
the administrator prefered savings in cash rather 
than in rice. In this context, the development of 
the economic problems in rural Java became more 
complex caused the declining of Lumbung Desa as 
credit institution in village level.
Meanwhile, the performance of Lumbung 
Desa in raising fund from villagers were brilliant 
in 1931. At that time, Lumbung Desa collected 
fund ammounted ƒ10.26 million (van Laanen, 
1980). It was the highest number that successfully 
achieved by Lumbung Desa that deposited by 
its members. The total number of rice and cash 
money that successfully collected can be viewed 
in Figure 2 below. It shows the development of 
the large quantity of rice had been collected from 
the rural areas of Java, while the Figure 3 shows 
the development of total money that successfully 
collected as capital. Both Figure 2 and 3, they are 
based on the same year, i.e. 1905-1940.
Figure 2. The number of rice that successfully 
collected by Lumbung Desa and distributed to the 
rurals as credit in 1905-1940 (in thousand tonnes)
Sources: Processed from Van Laanen, 1980.
Lumbung Desa as microcredit institution had 
debtors that dominantly were villagers. In every 
year it has more than 1 million customers. They 
used it as a place to obtain loans, either in the form 
of rice or cash. In 1919 was recorded as the peak 
of success of Lumbung Desa based on the number 
of customers. There were 1.56 million customers 
in all operational areas. Lumbung Desa then had 
experienced on the declining of customer number, 
but the total customer was never less than 1 million 
people. Figure 4 illustrates those phenomenon.
Figure 3.  Ammounts of money that successfully 
collected by Lumbung Desa as its capital in 1905-
1940 (millions of guilders)
Sources: Compiled from Van Laanen, 1980.
Figure 4. Number of Debtors of Lumbung Desa 
1915-1940 (Million People)
Source: Compiled from Van Laanen, 1980.
According of Figure 4, it is known that since 
1920s customers of Lumbung Desa had decreased. 
The total customer was only million people, 
compared to the previous period that could reach 
approximately 1.3 million. The condition is caused 
by several factors. First, the customers of Lumbung 
Desa had transferred to village bank (Bank Desa). 
Second, the operational area were similar for both 
institutions that would become easier to transferred 
as Bank Desa’s customer. Third, it was because of 
the complexity of economic development among 
rural communities. The increasing demand for 
cash had long been felt by rural community, it led 
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the number of customeres were declined, as they 
shifted to Bank Desa. For the rurals, cash needs 
was more urgent than rice, so that they required to 
establish more of Bank Desa rather than Lumbung 
Desa.
MANAGEMENT OF LUMBUNG DESA
Lumbung Desa managed independently by village 
communities. The building of Lumbung Desa 
made from teak or illegal wood that came from 
trees along the village road and cemetery. The 
walls made from webbing bamboo with precarious 
in its roof. It was similar with traditional home by 
square niche in the wall. It usually established near 
village hall. It was kind of Javanese communal 
house guarded in a day and night.
The physical construction of Lumbung Desa 
financed by some donations from its shareholders, 
those who deposited a portion of their rice harvest 
and intended as initial capital. The donations would 
be in rice and money, if it was in rice, it should 
be similar with ƒ0,2 to ƒ1,5 in money applied to 
each shareholder establishment in Lumbung Desa. 
Moreover, in physical development process of 
Lumbung Desa executed by villagers communally. 
It managed by a committee consisted of a headman, 
clerk, Kayim, and two villagers who have well-
reputable. They usually were appointed by Naib. 
The term of Naib needs to be shortly descibed as 
penghulu or modin.
The committee of Lumbung Desa was headed 
by a Naib. He had power to inspects or supervise 
committee member of Lumbung Desa. The two 
villagers who had pointed into committee members 
of Lumbung Desa selected by Naib that lived in 
the district. In the other hand, Naib was similar 
like “boss” of Kayim in religious personnel. They 
involved to supervise Lumbung Desa in district 
which its capital from villager alms (Zakat Fitrah). 
Naib was a leader of religious affairs to control 
and manage of Lumbung Desa. In that way, the 
existence of Naib could avoid mistakes in alms 
management of villagers. Naib was much involved 
to supervise management of Lumbung Desa.
Meanwhile the colonial government played 
an important role to maintain Lumbung Desa 
to be well-conducted and benefitted. They were 
similar as controller or the official of Bumiputera. 
Meanwhile there were Wedana that in charged 
directly to supervise Lumbung Desa management. 
However, Naib also had duty to check rice 
availability in the barn and synchronized with the 
management book.
According to De Wolff, the bookkeeping of 
Lumbung made by village secretary. The model 
was conducted based on direction of regent and 
controller. So that, Lumbung Desa depended on the 
management roles and responsibilities of colonial 
bureaucracy. The bookkeeping of Lumbung 
Desa supervised under the committee members. 
According to their job description, a clerk of 
Lumbung Desa paid arround  of the alms that was 
intended for village officials (Pamong Desa).
The committee members consisted of two 
ordinary residents who hold key to the barns, 
both were having their own keys. The opening of 
the barns door could only be done if witnessed 
by Kepala Desa. With this way, the Lumbung 
Desa had already implemented fairly and strict 
supervision. It locked with two types of keys, the 
barn doors could not be opened without permission 
from Kepala Desa. When the barn was opened, it 
could only be done with Kepala Desa as witness. 
It is expected that there would be no diversion or 
fraud in Lumbung Desa management because the 
opening barn door should be conducted with three 
people (Suharto, 1988).
Lumbung Desa according to De Wolff had 
some basic rules.
1. The rice amounts destined for Lumbung 
Desa was 4/10 of zakat. Rice then stored 
to the barns, and would be loaned to the 
villagers.
2. Each village should have their own barns 
that able to accommodate around 200 pikul 
of rice. In each farmer family would have 
storage space approximately ½ pikul. If the 
amount of rice stored exceeded, the barn 
area could be enlarged into a maximum 5 
pikul for each family. If it did not enough, 
then the ammount of rice that could not be 
accommodated, it would be sold and the 
money saved in treasury fund.
3. Rice in Lumbung Desa should be cultivated 
with the best treatment, so it might be used 
as seed. Therefore, the officials of Lumbung 
Desa was able to exchange some or all of 
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rice in the barns with rice from the other 
barns. Through this way, the official could 
obtain the best seed of rice.
4. Credit from Lumbung Desa should be done 
based on weight unit and its weighed should 
be in definite scale.
5. The amount of credit obtained from 
Lumbung Desa were only five pikul and must 
be returned a month after harvest. If they 
proposed a maximum ammount, it would 
not be denied, unless villagers who had 
applied credit already meet requirements of 
Lumbung Desa.
6. The barns building should be sturdy with 
uniform model, its roofed should have a 
good door with a strong key. The keys hold 
by two residents who were the officials of 
the villagers who became the administrator 
of Lumbung Desa. The opening of the barns 
door should be witnessed by the village 
head.
7. The walls should be written as Lumbung 
Desa by a white chalk, so that would be 
easily recognized.
One of the areas that used De Wolff model 
was  Cirebon. However, the people objected to set 
aside of their zakat as initial capital for Lumbung 
Desa. They assumed that the meaning and purpose 
of za k at designed for the poor. In this regard, 
the l a nd owners were willing to provide initial 
capit a l for Lumbung Desa. Besides that, there 
was d i fferent model of Lumbung Desa which 
diffe r ent by De Wolff Model. It was known as 
Lumbung Desa Cirebon because it developed in 
Cirebon. Lumbung Desa Cirebon was also known 
as Lumbung Desa Mesman because it came from 
the name of Residen Cirebon who had introduced 
the barns management that totally different with 
De Wolff model. It had accepted and implemented 
by villagers in Cirebon. The Resident of Cirebon 
had modified the collecting ways of initial capital. 
Therefore, the model of Lumbung Desa in Cirebon 
was known as Mesman model. He fundamentally 
changed in management, the way of initial capital 
raising, supervision, and as well as revenue for the 
barn itself.
Lumb u ng Desa  was  th ick  of  soc ia l 
characteristics, because it used to combat the 
debt bondage system (ijon) which considered to 
be de trimental among farmers. Therefore, the 
colonial government also provided various kinds of 
assistance either directly or indirectly to Lumbung 
Desa . The direct assistance was conducted by 
providing capital assistance, which could be used 
to buy rice from farmers. The government provided 
grants or subsidies to communities who wanted 
to establish Lumbung Desa. The government 
provided direct supplies of reserved rice or paddy 
for village barns. In addition, in some cases, such 
as in Karesidenan Surabaya, the resident even 
provided funds for the establishment of Lumbung 
Desa  at Lamongan and Gresik. In another case, 
Resident Besuki had gave money of f. 200 to 
buy paddy from farmers for the initial capital of 
Lumbung Desa.
Another government aid or subsidy was to 
allow the residents to take timber in forest for the 
establishment of the barns building. In addition, 
if there was no building, so the residents were 
unable to collect initial capital to buy and store 
rice. Therefore, the government allowed the coffee 
warehouse as a temporary place to store rice before 
the building finished. The government also allowed 
the community to use former guard house as an 
emergency if there was still no barn (Koloniaal 
Verslag 1908: 57).
The Cirebon model management handled by 
a committee which set up and tasked to manage 
Lumbung Desa. The committee known as Mantri, 
they should check the barns which located in rural 
areas of Cirebon residency once a week (Stibbe, 
1921). They paid from the barns that they have 
managed. At first, they got 10% loan interest 
formed in rice (Anonymous, 1906). The 5% of total 
loan interests was received by the barn’s manager. 
Therefore, the duties and responsible of Mantri in 
the barns committee was reduced. It led their salary 
received was shrinking. They only received 5% of 
total loan interest of the barn (Cramer, 1929).
At first, the Cirebon models only lend to 
its  members (who contributed initial capital for 
Lumbung Desa), but it did not applicable after 
initial capital restored. Thus, people who had not 
participated to submit rice as initial capital could 
loan in the barns. In operational, the barns charge 
its interest of 25%-50% of the borrowed rice. The 
barn management handed over to a committee 
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manager: the village head, village secretary, two 
people as representative participants that consisted 
the owners of capital deposit in Lumbung Desa. 
The non-ofiicials were overrun in the committee 
that village officials did not abuse their authority 
(Suharto, 1988). Members of the committee paid 
for  10% of loans in form of rice (Anonymous, 
1906). They paid with money, they would be 
responsible for Lumbung Desa management based 
on their ability and did not consider as additional 
burden (Cramer, 1929).
Several years later, the membership of the 
two non-official village was abolished and their 
authorities entirely done by village official. It 
was because they considered as useless and had 
no power to against village official domination in 
Lumbung Desa, especially from head of the village. 
Therefore, there were no opinions or suggestions 
submitted by members of the committee. They 
rarely gave information of their ammounts of credit 
borrowed from Lumbung Desa and did not want 
to get involved to collects credit that received by 
the debtor of Lumbung Desa. Their duties as key 
holder of the barns was not well executed. They 
usually leave the key of the barn to kuwu (Huls, 
1904). In the other hand, village officials who 
were not members of the barns committee had 
been burdened additional tasks in Lumbung Desa 
without getting paid. Based on that condition, both 
of the role abolition was non-acceptable.
Lumbung Desa’s committee in 1903 was 
replaced by the “Lumbung Gecommitteerden” or 
Lumbung Kometir. It established by the colonial 
government and appointed for conducting task to 
deal a collection of village managed about 10,000 
pikul of rice. They were appointed as Kometir 
sho uld have good reputable, similar dignity 
with head of the village, such as police or opas, 
prospective civil servants (intern), and others. 
That policy meant that they would be dare to face 
members of Lumbung Desa committee (Suharto, 
1988).
THE CAPITAL OF LUMBUNG DESA
There were two models of Lumbung Desa, De 
Wol ff and Mesman model. According to De 
Wolff model, Lumbung Desa emphasizes on the 
independence of villagers for collecting funds as 
initial capital. De Wolff views that villagers could 
use some of the alms (zakat) to collects and evolves 
into a cooperative association. The agency should 
notice of their own finance and initially helped the 
members in form of rice loan that were expected to 
develop into cash loan.
Rice loans helped farmers in lacking rice 
seeds condition or experiencing shortage during 
lean season. Farmers must return the amount of 
rice that had received plus a few percents cost of 
depreciation at harvest time. 
Upon receiving loan from Lumbung Desa, 
farmers were required to submit an application to 
the village head than asked committee for opinion. 
Based on this rule, none of loan application could 
be approved without notification and approval 
of the barn committee members first. If there 
were any committee member stressing out the 
imp ortance of certain application, the other 
committee members should report it to Naib who 
was inspector of Lumbung Desa management. If 
the problem deemed so important, then Naib could 
report it to Wedana.
The  barns model of Mesman or Cirebon 
was different with De Wolff model, especially for 
collecting the initial capital. Mesman or Cirebon 
model obtained its initial capital from rice field 
owners then deposited as the shareholders of 
Lumbung Desa. They handed amounts of rice and 
deposit it accordance with their rice field coverage 
are a. However, some of Kawedanan allowed 
people without rice field deposit their capital for 
establishment purposes of Lumbung Desa.
Th e ammounts determination and initial 
deposit time of each Lumbung Desa were different 
for each region. The amount of rice that should be 
paid for every member of Lumbung Desa as their 
initial capital adjusted for rice field areas owned 
by each member. In general, each member should 
deposit ¼ to 1 pikul (1 pikul almost similar with 
60 kg) for each rice field they have. Rice deposit 
could be done at once or gradually up to two years 
or longer. In some places the amounts and time 
deposit was not specified at all.
Loan interest rate between 25-50%, and usually 
the Lumbung Desa had average loan interest 50%. 
The 50% of loan interest was too high compared 
with amount of money received by farmers, but it 
was not too burdensome for them. Farmers usually 
borrowed rice from Lumbung Desa during growing 
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or dry season. At that time, they were facing both 
rice seeds shortage and financial crisis to meet 
their needs. During the shortage, their rice would 
worth money as much as ƒ3 per pikul. If they had 
borrowed 2 pikul of rice from Lumbung Desa, they 
would receive money around ƒ6. During harvest 
season, they had to return 3 pikul of rice (consists 
of 2 pikul of loan plus 1 interest). In harvest time, 
they would have money as much as ƒ2 for 1 pikul 
of rice (Anonymous, 1906). Therefore, the 3 pikul 
as their payment would be worth much as ƒ6. Thus, 
the 50% loan interest of Lumbung Desa Village 
Depository could not be considered as burdensome 
for farmers.
In Lumbung Desa, the 25-50% loan interest 
would be double rice supply and after a few years 
all initial capital could be returned to the members. 
In many cases, they could even donate their initial 
capital contribution to the Lumbung Desa. In this 
way, according to Mesman, Lumbung Desa can 
develop into a village-level credit institution and 
capable of giving loans to villagers especially rice 
farmers during plantation or in case of drought that 
resulted in famine.
Previously, the debtor of Mesman model 
was only villagers who had deposited their initial 
ri ce capital in the establishment of Lumbung 
Desa. In its development, after Lumbung Desa 
had been able to meet its needs, the initial capital 
was returned to shareholders and turned into a 
communal institution owned by villagers. Through 
this way, Lumbung Desa had its own rice that was 
profit from its management in storing rice as initial 
capital. The people who previously did not store 
rice as their initial capital in the barns, they could 
also be given a loan. The only condition was that 
they should be the local villagers, so that loans 
never be permitted to be given to people who lived 
in other village.
Th e stored rice could be returned to 
shareholders before Lumbung Desa has its own 
rice from profits if they had moved to another 
village. It could also be returned to shareholder’s 
beneficiary if the shareholder dies. Under the 
applicable regulations, stored rice was returned to 
shareholders if they violate the rules, incurably ill, 
or  a dismissed headman (Huls, 1904).
According to Mesman model, the maximum 
rice loan that could be borrowed by a villager was 
5 pikul per year. In practice, villagers borrowed 1 
pikul of rice in each time they applied for rice loan. 
They scheduled loan application to borrow, part 
one villager borrowed paddy for seed, and they 
used it to cultivate their rice filed, and part two 
remaining sacks for famine comes. The approval 
of credit laid under management committee’s of 
Lumbung Desa.
The remaining rice in Lumbung Desa was 
tr aded every year. Some of incoming money 
was used to pay management cost and building 
maintenance. The rest of the money was deposited 
as reserved fund to an Afdelingsbank or community 
bank. In this way, indigenous population of rural 
Java had a debt-free Lumbung Desa building with 
sufficient rice supply inside. Moreover, villagers 
al so had saving account in Afdelingsbank as 
reserve fund (Koloniaal Verslag, 1914). If reserved 
fund of Lumbung Desa had increased amount 
higher than the needs, the rest of it would be 
deposited to village treasury and later it became 
village communal funds (Graff, Stibbe, 1918).
FLEXIBILITY OF LUMBUNG DESA
Historical facts show that Lumbung Desa was a 
village-level credit institution in a flexible nature 
due to its existence in the middle of rural area 
community where relational patterns were very 
pe rsonal and high level of trust. This distinct 
advantage allowed villagers as customers to store 
and take credit from the barns. Credit disbursement 
could be made any time and simultaneous with 
cr edit submission. Lumbung Desa as credit 
institution had flexible properties because it could 
transform into credit institution in accordance 
with villagers needs and it did not require either 
complicated mechanisms, procedures, or time 
co nsuming. The easy and fast principles in 
reality had become hallmark of Lumbung Desa 
mechanism that was developed during the 1930s. 
Lumbung Desa had evolved in accordance with 
vi llager’s needs in rural Java, therefore, a large 
variety with various uses of Lumbung Desa could 
be found in Java. In its development, Lumbung 
Desa as village-level credit institution did not only 
serve rice credit but also monetary credit for the 
community. Some of them were in Surabaya, they 
used their spare money to be loaned to farmers 
with at least 1% interest/ month. It was widely 
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used by credit debtors, i.e. farmers as agricultural 
credit because it was utilized for various plant 
cultivations (Verslag van het Volkscredietwezen, 
1920).
Thus, there were two types of Lumbung Desa 
that different with other business units. First, 
it  provided credit in rice and money; second, 
provided financial credit for the debtors, i.e. 
farmers in rural Java. Furthermore, based on the 
research conducted, there were several types of 
Lumbung Desa. First, Koperasi Lumbung or the 
barns union existed up to 1939, there were 32 
Koperasi Lumbung in Indonesia in that time, 13 
out 32 were located in Indramayu precisely in 
Kawedanan Kandanghaur. Koperasi Lumbung was 
designed to eradicate moneylender or pengijon that 
mostly farmers used to lend money. In this case, 
farmers paid their loans to Koperasi Lumbung in 
rice. The differences of loans between Lumbung 
Desa and Koperasi Lumbung in the form of credits. 
Lumbung Desa gave loans in rice, while Koperasi 
Lumbung gave loans in cash, but both of them were 
similar in payments made in rice.
The second form of the barns was Lumbung 
Bibit (seed barns), spread in East Java residencies, 
i. e. Besuki and Madiun. The numbers reached 
hundreds of barns. Only in Besuki, there were 
mo re than 300 Lumbung Desa belonged to 
farmer’s cooperative society under supervision of 
Agricultural Department. The Lumbung Bibit was 
also found in West Java, established by Department 
of Agriculture of West Java and aimed to increase 
th e usage of best rice seeds. The seeds were 
normally selected by the members who stored rice 
in their own barns (Suharto, 1988).
The third type of the barn called Lumbung 
Pajak or tax barn. It actually was union institution 
founded and propagated by “Farm Pillars”, an 
organization under Great Indonesia Party (Partai 
Indonesia Raya or Parindra). It was established 
because of the massive circulation of money to rural 
areas of Java. Taxes paid by farmers were derived 
from their rice trading money. It was help enough 
because farmers needed to temporarily hold their 
harvest until the price was in good condition, just 
like before harvest period, especially during dry 
season. Lumbung Pajak’s role was to hold or piled 
up rice to be used to pay taxes. When rice price was 
back to normal, Lumbung Pajak would trade the 
rice. The proceeds would pay the member’s tax and 
remaining rice would be returned to each member.
CONCLUSION
Lumbung Desa is village-level credit institutions 
pr oviding credit in rice or cash. The credit 
institutions have traditionally existed in rural people 
of  Java before the Dutch colonial government 
established Volkscredietwezen. Lumbung Desa 
based on character of villagers, they have personal 
social relationships with high level of confidence. 
It developed in rural area which their livelihood 
was to cultivate rice. In line with implementation 
of ethical policy, the colonial government was 
developed a credit in each rural area. It was 
expected to help farmers to fight against middlemen 
and moneylenders, so that their welfare and income 
would increase. By the government support, it 
developed rapidly during the early decades of the 
twentieth century. However, it then also stimulated 
the emergence with many problems that eventually 
made other barns closed or malfunctioned.
As credit institution at village level, Lumbung 
Desa could never be separated from the role 
of both government bureaucracy, Kawedanan 
and the village bureaucracy. It was executed 
on behalf to respect of villagers against their 
traditional leader. The credit institution existed 
and developed in funding relied on the villagers. 
Lumbung Desa collected rice and money from 
villagers who became the members. When Idhul 
Fitri comes, the management of Lumbung Desa 
would distribute net profit (profits after reduced by 
costs management) to the members. The ammount 
of profits distribution conducted according on 
how much rice or paid capital to the barn in the 
early days of harvest. Lumbung Desa existed 
and developed by that way in rural indigenous 
population of Java during colonial period.
Lumbung Desa lived and thrived because its 
flexibility and characterized by an easy and fast 
way, so it could adapt to fit the villager’s needs as a 
customer. In the 1930s, there were three varieties of 
Lumbung Desa namely, Lumbung Pajak (tax barn), 
Lumbung Bibit (seedlings barn), and Koperasi 
Lumbung (barn union). Each type of the barns had 
their own advantages and developed according 
to the people needs. Based on that condition, 
Lumbung Desa could existed and thrived at least 
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until beginning of the independence of Republic 
Indonesia.
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